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Member, Class of 1979
I. INTRODUCTION
CONGRESS ENACTED the Export Administration Amendments
of 19771 in an attempt to alleviate the shortcomings of export regulation
2
under the Export Administration Act of 1969. The significance of these
changes upon the deeply imbedded problems of export control presents
an important topic for study.
Major flaws in regulation under the Export Administration Act of
1969 have severely retarded efforts of United States industry to expand
sales of non-strategic3 advanced technology goods to Communist coun-
tries. Four factors can be isolated which have caused the undue restric-
tion of sales:
1. ExportAdministrationAmendmentsof1977, PUB. L No. 95-52, 91Stat. 235 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as EAA '77].
2. Currently, the Executive Branch administers export controls under three Congressional grants
ofpower. The Tradingwith the Enemy Act of 1917, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (1976), gives the President
broad powers to prohibit exports to all enemies with whom the United States is at war and their allies.
When the Export Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401 (1970). expires without timely renewal,
the President uses the Trading with the Enemy Act to carry out the functions of the former law. 123
CONG. REC. H.3266 (daily ed. April 20, 1977). The Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951,
22 U.S.C. app. §§ 1611-13 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Battle Act], forbids the export of arms,
ammunition, implements of war and atomic energy materials to Communist countries. This act
declares that the U.S. shall supply no military, economic, or financial assistance to any nation that fills
to apply the embargo to any member of the Soviet bloc. The Export Administration Act of 1969, 50
U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-13 (1976) [hereinafter cited as EAA '69], intends to curtail exports ofstrategic
goods to communist countries.
3. Non-strategic refers to those goods that would fail to "'make a significant contribution to the
military potential of any other nation or nations which would prove detrimental to the national
security of the United States." EAA "69, § 2402(1), supra note 2.
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(1) Congress posed conflicting policy goals without providing a method
for balancing these interests.
4
(2) The licensing criteria of the Office of Export Administration (OEA)
were ambiguous. 5
(3) Cumbersome administration caused excessive licensing delays.0
(4) The United States rigidly applied the free world's multilateral
embargo of exports upon Communist countries while the remaining
participants7 in the embargo refused to follow this prohibition as
strictly.
The embargo of goods to the Communist countries is a post World
War II phenomenon. The first sweeping system of United States export
controls was initiated by Congress during World War II in the interest of
national defense. 9 After the war, controls were retained to prevent the
export of items which were in critically short supply in the United
States.' 0 The President also used the controls to channel the export of
specific goods to Western European countries on a priority basis under
the Marshall Plan. " As the Cold War intensified, the United States made
export regulations an instrument of economic warfare against the Com-
munist countries.'
2
Economic warfare is based on the theory that trade frees Communist
resources to be spent on military goods, thus increasing their overall
military strength. As economist Thomas Schelling succinctly states the
argument:
Wheat shipments may have the same effect on military programs as jet
engine sales. Wheat shipments may permit the Soviets to keep chemi-
cal industries oriented toward munitions rather than fertilizers; jet
engine sales may permit the Soviets to allocate engineering resources
to consumer goods rather than jet engines.' 3
4. Klitgaard and Huff, Limiting Exports on National Security Grounds, in 4 APPENDIcEs: CoMMIs,-
SIONONTHEORGANIZATIONOFTHE GOVERNMENTFOETHECONDUCTOF FOREIGNPOLIcY443(1975)
[hereinafter cited as APPENDICES].
5. Id. at 447.
6. Export Licensing of Advanced Technology: A Review: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on
International Trade and Commerce of the Committee on International Relations, Part 1, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 105 (1976) (hereinafter cited as Advanced Technology Hearings].
7. The remaining participants include Japan and all of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) countries except Iceland. See note 22 infra.
8. Advanced Technology Hearings, supra note 7, at 37.
9. APPENDICES, supra note 5, at 449.
10. Berman and Carson, U.S. Export Controls-Past, Present andFuture, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 795
(1967) [hereinafter cited as Berman].
11. Id.
12. APPENDICES, supra note 5, at 449.
13. Id. at 455.
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Congress implemented the policy of economic warfare'14 by passing
the Export Control Act of 1949.15 This first set of comprehensive
peacetime export controls in the United States16 called for the restriction
of exports to any nation for reasons of short supply, national security, or
foreign policy. 17 The doctrine of economic warfare was implemented
against the Communist countries by restricting exports on the grounds of
"national security" or "foreign policy."' 8 In a 1962 amendment to the
Export Control Act of 1949, Congress openly approved economic warfare
by providing that exports could be restricted not only if they increased
military potential, but also economic potential ofa Communist country.19
This United States embargo would have been futile had it remained a
unilateral effort. To effectuate the policy of economic warfare, the United
States organized the Consultive Group Coordinating Committee
(COCOM)2 0 to control exports to the Communist bloc on a multilateral
basis. 2 ' COCOM established a list of commodities that were to be uni-
formly denied to the Soviet bloc. The purpose of the COCOM Agreement
was to prohibit the participating countries from exporting a restricted
item to any of the Communist countries. 22 Each nation participates in the
multilateral embargo by incorporating the COCOM list of restricted
products into its export control program. 23 Ifa member desires to export a
particular restricted item, an exception request can be made to the
Coordinating Committee. 24
Towards the latter part of the 1960s, mounting dissatisfaction with the
policy of economic warfare began to be expressed in Congressional hear-
ings. 25 Some of the fundamental premises of the Cold war were called
14. Id. at 449.
15. Export Control Act of 1949, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2021-2032 (expired Dec. 31,1969) [hereinafter
cited as ECA '49].
16. Berman, supra note 11, at 791-92.
17. ECA '49, supra note 16, § 2022.
18. Berman, supra note 11, at 796.
19. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2023(a) (Supp. I 1965) (repealed 1969) [hereinafter cited as 1962
Amendment].
20. COCOM consists of Japan and all the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries
except Iceland. 123 CONrG. REC. 7142 (no. 76) (daily ed.).
21. APPENDiCES, supra note 5, at 449.
22. APPF-NDIcEs, supra note 5, at 449.
23. The U.S. participates in COCOM through the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1951, 22
U.S.C. app. §§ 1611-13 (1951). 3 L. + POLy iNIN'L Bus. 72 n.111 (1971).
24. Extension of the Export Administration Act: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 134 (1976) (statement of Arthur T. Downey)
[hereinafter cited as S. 3084 Hearings].
" 25. To Extend and Amend the Export Control Act of 1949: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
International Trade of the House Committee on Banking and Crrency, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as 1969 House Hearings].
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into question, especially the notion that Soviet gains from non-military
trade could be translated into improved military capabilities.20 Further-
more, other COCOM countries had been reluctant to follow a policy of
economic warfare. Since Western Europe and Japan had been much
more dependent upon foreign trade for their economic well-being than had
the relatively self-sufficient United States, they had pressured COCOM
into substantially reducing its list of restricted exports to embargo only
strategic items. 27 By 1968 the United States had become the only country
actively engaged in economic warfare against the Communists. It unilater-
ally restricted exports of 1100 items which were freely available to Com-
munist countries from COCOM nations and other sources.2 8
Congress recognized the burden placed on United States businesses
in their attempts to capture a significant portion of the trade with Com-
munist countries. Congress substantially amended the Export Control
Act of 1949 by enacting the Export Administration Act of 1969.29 Con-
gress intended a complete reversal of United States export policy, sub-
stituting the goal of trade promotion for that of trade repression. 30 The
new Act eliminated the "economic potential" test of 1962 amendment.
Moreover, the 1969 law explicitly declared that "it is the policy of the
United States... to encourage trade with all countries with which we have
diplomatic or trading relations."
31
Thus, in 1969 the United States officially recognized "the fundamental
trade-off between economic warfare and economic welfare." 32 Neverthe-
less, serious problems in the administration of export controls under the
1969 Act have prevented United States industry from realizing the full
potential oftrade with Eastern Europe and the U. S. S. R. An examination of
the procedure and criteria by which an export application is evaluated
illustrates the nature of these problems.
II. EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT: 1969-1976
A. Procedure and Criteria
A United States company must obtain a validated license from the
Commerce Department to export specified commodities to particular
26. APPENDICES, supra note 5, at 450.
27. Id.
28. 1969 House Hearings, supra note 26, at 7.
29. EAA '69, supra note 2.
30. APPENDICES, supra note 5, at 451.
31. EAA '69, supra note 2, § 2402 (1).
32. APPENDICES, supra note 5, at 455.
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foreign countries. 33 A validated license is necessary where the Com-
merce Department determines that a particular importing country shall
have limited or no access to specific categories of United States goods.
Mechanically, the categories of goods to which access is restricted are
published in the Commodity Control List (CCL) and the countries to
which export is restricted are listed opposite each category.34 For exam-
ple, the CCL may contain the category semi-conductors. Opposite the
listing semi-conductors is the letter Y representing the Soviet bloc. A
United States exporter must obtain a validated license to sell any semi-
conductor item to a Soviet bloc country. However, he may export the
same commodity to any other country without such a license.
The Commerce Department's Office of Export Administration
(OEA) issues validated licenses. 35 The exporter submits an application for
a validated license to the OEA which transmits the application through
each of its three divisions: operations, licensing and policy planning. In
the Operations Division, applications are numbered. The names of the
parties to the transaction are checked against a list of known or suspected
diverters of strategic goods. 36 The East bloc applications are separated
from the others.37 A memorandum is sent to the Operating Committee on
each East bloc application involving technical data or a value over
$200,000.38 All applications are then sent to the Licensing Division. 39
In the Licensing Division each application is distributed for evalua-
tion to one of three branches: computers, electronics or capital goods.
The exports destined for a non-East bloc country usually go directly to the
issuance section of the Operations Division for final action. East bloc
cases are retained and individually examined to determine if additional
information is needed to make a decision on the application. After obtain-
ing the needed information, the Licensing Division determines whether
the East bloc application should proceed to the Policy Planning Divi-
sion.40 Since the Department of Defense must review all exports to East
33. Commerce issues licenses oftwo types: general and validated. General licenses are automati-
cally granted wherever a validated license is not required. 15 C.F.R. 370, 370.2 (1977).
34. 15 C.F.R. 370.3-370.6; "For export control purposes foreign countries are separated into
seven country groups designated by the symbols Q', 'S'., 'V, ', T, and Z.' . .Canada is not
included in any group and will be referred to by name throughout the Export Administration
Regulations." 15 C.F.R. 370, Supplement No. 1--Country Groups (19777).
35. Advanced Technology Hearings, supra note 7, at 69.
36. Id. at 65-66.
37. Id. at 78-79.
38. Id.
39. S. 3084 Hearings, supra note 25, at 152.
40. Id.
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bloc countries and can do so only in its capacity as a member of the Policy
Planning Divison, the Licensing Division will necessarily send the appli-
cation to policy planning.
41
Within the Policy Planning Division the applications are sent to the
appropriate branches for review: computers, electronics or capital
goods. 42 The Policy Planning Division then forwards the applications to
Defense in two ways. Policy Planning may'determine that the Operating
Committee should decide on the application. The Operating Committee
consists of representatives from the Departments of Commerce, De-
fense, State and Treasury, the National Aeronautics Ind Space Adminis-
tration, and the Energy Research and Development Administration, with
the CIA as a regular advisor. 43 The Committee, chaired by the Com-
merce Department representative, meets weekly to discuss export con-
trol problems and individual transactions. 44 Application decisions must
receive the unanimous approval of the Committee. If there is an impasse
in the Operating Committee regarding a validated license, appeal is made
to the Advisory Committee on Export Policy (ACEP), which consists of
Assistant-Secretaries of Commerce, State and Defense.45 If the ACEP
fails to achieve a consensus, the Secretaries of the three departments are
called upon to arbitrate the issue.46 The President makes the final deci-
sion in those rare instances where the Secretaries cannot resolve the
question. 
47
Where the Policy Planning Division decides that an East bloc appli-
cation needs no review by the Operating Committee, the application is
sent directly to the Defense Department 8 for final determination, sub-
ject to Presidential veto.49 If a license request requires neither a review
by the Operating Committee nor one by Defense, 50 the Policy Planning
41. The Defense Appropriations Authorization Act of 1975, PuB. L. No. 93-365, Title VII, § 709,
Aug. 5, 1974; 88 Stat. 408 [hereinafter cited as DOD Appropriations Act], requires the Department
of Defense to review all applications to Communist countries. The Defense Department only reviews
these exports in its role as a member of the Policy Planning Division. Accordingly, East bloc
applications are sent to this Division. However, the Defense Department has delegated the review of
a limited number and specified types ofapplications to the Commerce Department. As a result, some
East bloc applications will not be reviewed by Department of Defense. Export Administration
Amendments of 1974, PUB. L. No. 9,-500, 88 Stat. 1552 (1974) (enacting 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403(a)
and amending N50 U.S.C. §§ 2401, 2403, 2404, 2409 and 2413) [hereinafler cited as EAA '74].
42. Advanced Technology Hearings, supra note 7, at 78-79. See enclosed foldout.
43. S. 3084 Hearings, supra note 25, at 128.
44. Id.
45. APPENDICES, supra note 5, at 452.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Advanced Technology Hearings, supra note 7, at 78-79.
49. Department ofDefense Appropriations Act,supra note42; EAA'74, §2403(b)(I)supra note42,
50. This could be either a non-East bloc application that has entered the policy planning division
or an East bloc application for which DOD has delegated to Commerce the authority to review the
case.
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Division decides whether a referral to the Multi-Agency is required. 51 If
such referral is necessary, the Multi-Agency reviews the application and
returns it to Policy Planning for a final decision. 52 If no referral is called
for, Policy Planning makes the ultimate determination. On approval, the
application goes to the issuance section of the Operations Division where
the license is actually granted.
5 3
Throughout this procedure, the OEA applies four sets of criteria in
determining whether to grant a validated license. First, a license will be
denied if the item is in short supply in the United States. 54 Second, export
controls will be imposed "to the extent necessary to further significantly
the foreign policy of the United States."5 5 Third, the export will be
restricted if contrary to the "national interest,"'5 6 determined by such
factors as "the world economic situation,... politics, the status ofdomestic
employment or unemployment, and unspecified sociological and pys-
chological factors. '" 5 7 Fourth, the Export Administration Act calls for
restricting "the export of goods and technology which would make a
significant contribution to the military potential of any other nation or
nations which would prove detrimental to the national security of the
United States."
58
The Department of Defense, which establishes the criteria for na-
tional security,59 seeks to preserve such security by maintaining the
technology gap between the United States and the Soviet bloc.60 The
wider the gap, the stronger the deterrent against technological and
military surprise.
The notion [is] that certain goods, if exported freely, would provide the
Communists with technologies unobtainable by them at any price over
some relevant time horizon, and [this] delay in Communist procure-
ment makes the U.S. deterrent more credible, insures the superiority
of U.S. military forces, and reduces the possibility of technological
surprise.
61
51. S. 3084 Hearings, supra note 25, at 152.
52. Id.
53. Advanced Technology Hearings, supra note 7, at 78-79.
54. EAA '69, supra note 1, § 2402.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. S. 3084 Hearings, supra note 25, at 359.
58. EAA "69, supra note 2, § 2402.
59. Advanced Technology Hearings, supra note 7, at 66.
60. Id. at 78.
61. APPENDicEs, supra note 5, at 451.
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However, gains that close a technology gap may be one of two types,
resource-freeing or capability-enhancing. 62 Resource-freeing gains allow
a Communist country to operate at a given level of technological capabil-
ity at a lower cost but do not provide a higher level of technology
unobtainable at any cost. 63 The United States officially abandoned its
attempt to increase the Soviets' cost of procuring a given level of military
capability when it rejected the "economic potential" test as a basis for
imposing export controls. 64 The United States officially uses export con-
trols only to limit capability-enhancing gains, those that increase the
absolute level of the Communist country's military potential. 65
The Department of Defense's central concern is one of identifying
which advanced technologies amount to capability-enhancing gains that
could contribute to Soviet military potential. In this process the Depart-
ment identifies what products are used extensively by the military. The
standard is mechanical: if the United States military uses more than a
certain percentage of a product, it is judged to have extensive military
use. 66 The Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering
(DDR&E) provides the needed information on the use of advanced
technologies in the United States military. 67 The Defense Department
places an embargo on the transfer of those technologies used by the
military which are beyond Communist productive capabilities.68
B. Significant Shortcomings of the Export Administration Act of 1969
The 1969 Act's major flaw was that Congress posed two conflicting
policy goals without providing a method of balancing these interests. The
declaration of policy states that the United States will "encourage trade
with all countries with which we have diplomatic or trading relations.""
The rationale for this policy is in the Congressional Statement of Find-
ings:
The unwarranted restriction of exports from the United States has a
serious adverse effect on our balance of payments, particularly when
export restrictions applied by the United States are more extensive
than export restrictions imposed by countries with which the United
States has defense treaty commitments.7
0
62. Id. at 455.
63. Id.
64. See text accompanying notes 30-35 supra.
65. APPENDICES, supra note 5, at 455.
66. Id. at 453 n.19.
67. Id. at 452.
68. Id. at 453.
69. EAA '69, supra note 2, § 2402.
70. Id. § 2401.
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However, the act retains the principle of export restriction where such
trade would be against either the national interest or national security.
71
In applying this dual criterion, the OEA has displayed a tendency to
view national interest and security considerations as paramount, while
completely overlooking the potential financial benefits of certain exports:
"It is considered sufficient for restriction that a security risk exists - even
if the risk is small and the potential sales large." 72 The Congressional
findings of the Export Administration Amendments of 1977 also recog-
nize this as an unwarranted restriction of certain exports.
The uncertainty of policy toward certain categories of exports has
curtailed the efforts of American business in those categories to the
detriment of the overall attempt to improve the trade balance of the
United States.
7 3
The 1969 Act also failed to correct major shortcomings of prior export
regulation in the areas of licensing procedure, licensing criteria, and the
multilateral embargo. Despite Congressional intent to expand trade with
Communist countries, the OEA places excessive procedural burdens on
all applications to such nations. 74 The unwieldy licensing process results
in untimely decisions on Soviet bloc cases.75 The Commerce Department
reports that it processes 85 percent of its applications within a matter of
days. However, the remaining 15 percent, applications to Communist
countries, are subject to lengthy delays.7 6 Such export applications com-
monly require six to eight months for decision. 77 This cumbersome
procedure is compounded by the requirement ofa unanimous approval in
both the Operating Committee and interagency consultations.78
An analysis of the OEA's processing of East bloc applications illus-
trates how the interplay of procedural burdens and the rule of unanimity
result in licensing delays. The Licensing Division presents no substantial
obstacle to the timely processing of applications. However, since all East
bloc applications must go to Policy Planning, review by the Licensing
Division seems a fruitless exercise. License applications for technology
exports to the Soviet bloc virtually come to a standstill in the Policy
71. Id. § 2402.
72. APPENDICES, supra note 5, at 454.
73. EAA '69, supra note 2, § 2401.
74. Advanced Technology Hearings, supra note 7, at 78-79.
75. Id. at 105.
76. S. 3084 Hearings, supra note 25, at 344.
77. Id. at 348.
78. Id. at 317.
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Planning Division. The major barrier to speedy processing stems from
extensive use of interagency consultation, 79 where the requirement of
unanimous approval compounds delay.80 In effect, every agency posses-
ses the power to veto an application. 81 Separate agencies, unfortunately,
frequently apply differing criteria when considering the application. The
proceedings within the Operating Committee exemplify this prime
source of delay.
The positions taken by each of the agencies appear almost a caricature:
Defense officials vetoing any item they can get a handle on, if only to
delay for a couple of years Communist aquisition of the technology
(reflecting their earlier commitment to economic warfare against
socialist states); State (and the White House, especially in the Nixon
period) prepared to make an exception for almost any item, as long as it
appears to contribute to detente; Commerce, making American firms'
case that since technology is going to be sold in any case, the U.S.
should at least reap the benefit of making the sale. 8
2
"The agencies have often asked the White House for 'the precise criteria
U.S. departments and agencies should use in implementing the Export
Administration Act of 1969.' But the White House has issued none."8' 3
Thus, the rule of unanimity is a formidable barrier to the expeditious
processing of an application.
Congress, recognizing that excessive licensing delays place United
States industry at a competitive disadvantage with its European and
Japanese competitors, amended the Export Administration Act in 1974 in
an attempt to expedite the process. The amendment provides that "any
export license application. . . shall be approved. . . or disapproved not
later than 90 days after its submission."'8 4 Congress, however, included
the escape clause: "If additional time is required, the Secretary of Com-
merce...shall inform the applicant of the circumstances requiring such
additional time and give an estimate of when his decision will be made."8 5
This deadline has failed to reduce delays. 8 6 The OEA merely issues one of
four stock reasons for delays greater than ninety days, none of which is
informative: 1) consulting with other agencies; 2) consultingwith COCOM
79. Advanced Technology Hearings, supra note 7, at 23.
80. Id. at vii.
81. Id.
82. APPENDICES, supra note 5, at 444.
83. Id.
84. EAA '74, supra note 42, § 5.
85. Id.
86. Extention of the Export Administration Act of 1969: Hearingi Before the Committee on
International Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 602 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Part I Hearings].
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countries; 3) beingreviewedby the Defense Department; and4) personnel
commitments to other aspects of the export control program. 7 The goal of
ninetydaydecisionshasnotbeenachieved. Ironically, someindustrieshave
reported slight increases in licensing delays despite the enactment of the
1974 provision. 
88
The shortcoming of ambiguous licensing criteria ha not been resol-
ved.8 9 Congress has authorized the Department of Defense to curtail any
exports to Communist countries that may significantly increase their
military capabilities.90 This Department attempts to retard the growth of
Communist military potential by preserving the technology gap between
the United States and the Soviet bloc.91 A technological lead, however,,
does not always imply a military lead. Many technical advances may
contribute to Soviet economic potential, yet could have little effect on its
military potential.
92
Export control of large computers illustrates how the regulations
unnecessarily restrict technology that can offer little or no capability
enhancing military gains to the Soviet bloc. 93 Specialists in the fields of
computer technology, military science, and Soviet affairs conducted a
study on the effect of large Western computers on Soviet military ac-
tivities.9 4 They considered what the capability-enhancing differences of
these machines would be upon the Soviet military in the areas of com-
mand and control, logistics, military research and development, intelli-
gence, missile guidance, anti-ballistic missile systems and avionics.95 The
study assumed that the publicly available BESM-6 computer, first re-
leased in 1965, represented the current level of Soviet computing
power.9 6 The results of the investigation are surprising. The Soviet
military achieves results similar to those of the United States computer
intensive defense policy by substituting time, labor and other military
resources for large computers.9 7 Furthermore, "the U.S. military seldom
uses large computers more sophisticated than the Soviet BESM-6; when
it does, there is little evidence of a substantial difference in capabilities
from those the Soviets obtain or would desire, given their policies. "
98
87. Advanced Technology Hearings, supra note 7, at 120.
88. Id. at 119; Part I Hearings, supra note 87, at 351-52.
89. Advanced Technology Hearings, supra note 7, at vii.
90. EAA "69, supra note 1, § 2403(h).
91. Advanced Technology Hearings, supra note 7; at 78.
92. APPENDICEs, supra note 5, at 444-45.
93. Advanced Technology Hearings, supra note 7, at 176.
94. AP'PENDICEs, supra note 5, at 459-64.
95. Id. at 459.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 463.
98. Id.
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While large computers may not enhance Communist military
capabilities, the availability of greater computational power would enable
the East bloc to save economic resources. Currently, the Soviets have
substituted greater quantities of arms and manpower for large comput-
ers. 99 It is submitted that the Defense Department, contrary to declared
official United States policy, prohibits the export oF large computers to
deprive the Communist military of resource-freeing gains rather than
capability-enhancing potential.
In 1969 the United States officially rejected the economical potential
test as a basis for export restriction. 100 Nevertheless, defense officials
continue to restrict exports because of their possible impact on Com-
munist economic capabilities: 10 '
Many officials who administer export controls have not changed their
minds about the link between Soviet economic strength and Soviet
military strength. They have been forced to shift their grounds for
denying U.S. export licenses: licenses previously denied because of a
product's contribution to Soviet economic potential are now rejected
because of its contributions to Soviet military potential.' 02
Moreover, the OEA's procedure explicitly incorporates the economic
potential test into the application decision making process by giving the
Operating Committee special notice if an export to a Communist nation
involves greater than $200,000 worth of goods, regardless of the nature of
the commodity. '0 3 Thus, through unlimited discretion, Defense officials
ban exports of almost any United States item merely by claiming that its
use would result in a capability-enhancing gain that contributes signifi-
cantly to military potential. 1
0 4
The fourth significant failure of United States export administration
stems from COCOM's ineffective multilateral embargo. Strategic com-
modities are readily available to Communist countries through sales from
COCOM participants other than the United States. These nations have
exported embargoed goods for two reasons. First, lack of uniformity exists
in interpreting standards: 10 5 "COCOM countries may interpret a
COCOM item as not covering a particular shipment, wherefis the United
99. Id. at 461.
100. EAA '69, supra note 2.
101. S. 3084 Hearings, supra note 25, at 76.
102. APPENDICES, supra note 5, at 445.
103. Advanced Technology Hearings, supra note 7, at 78-79.
104. See APPENDICES, supra note 5, at 445.
105. H.R. REP. No. 95-190, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1977) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 95-190],
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States . . .might regard it as being covered." 0 6 Second, no supra-
national enforcement mechanism exists with the power to impose sanc-
tions on member nations that fail to observe the embargo. 10 7 Communist
countries also attain embargoed equipment from non-COCOM high
technology exporters,' including Austria, Brazil, India, Spain, Sweden
and Switzerland.' 0 9 Sweden and Switzerland in particular are known to
have produced and exported some of the most sophisticated COCOM
embargoed commodities to the Soviet bloc." 0 Furthermore, United
States multinationals with foreign subsidiaries often circumvent export
regulations by selling restricted goods to Communist nations through
their foreign branches. "I As a restilt, the Soviets can get one copy of any
item produced by a United States domestic corporation, with a few
military exceptions, and several copies of any product commercially
available in Western countries."l 2 In short, Communist countries are
able to import strategic technologies despite COCOM safeguards.
Non-military sales are being restricted by the OEA regardless of
availability of such goods from Japan and Western Europe.113 This
foreign availability exists for two reasons. First, while the United States
strictly curtails the export of non-strategic items on the COCOM list, our
COCOM partners neglect to uphold these restrictions as rigidly."1
4
Second, the Commodity Control List contains sixty-eight items that are
unrestricted by COCOM." x5 The United States refuses to allow the
export of many non-strategic technologies freely available to Communist
countries such as semi-conductors, integrated circuits, telecommunica-
tion gear, magnetohydrodynamic equipment, machine tools and large
computers, medical and pharmaceutical equipment and the capability to
produce calculators."
6
The OEA maintains these unilateral controls on the non-military
items in spite of the Export Administration Act's provision that "the
President shall remove unilateral export controls . . . which he deter-
mines are available without restriction from sources outside the United
106. Advanced Technology Hearings, supra note 7, at 57.
107. 1969 House Hearings, supra note 26, at 308.
108. Advanced Technology Hearings, supra note 7, at 58.
109. Id. at 154.
110. Id. at 58.
111. APPENDICES, supra note 5, at 446.
112. Id.
113. S. 3084 Hearings, supra note 25, at 325.
114. Advanced Technology Hearings, supra note 7, at 154.
115. Export Licensing of Advanced Technology: A Review: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
International Trade and Commerce of the Committee on International Relations, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. Part 1125 (1976) (reprint of a Washington Post Article by Dan Morgan).
116. APPENDICES, supra note 5, at 445-46.
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States in significant quantities and comparable in quality to those pro-
duced in the United States.' 11 7 Unilateral controls persist because author-
ity to make the final judgment as to existing levels of foreign technology
available to the East bloc has been delegated to the CIA. The CIA
consistently understates the quality of that technology, so as to prohibit
their export to the Soviets:1
1 8
The CIA, which is the sole source of official judgments on "foreign
availability" - that is, whether a product equivalent to one an Ameri-
can company proposes to sell is available in the Bloc or in other
countries - continues to interpret "availability" and "equivalence" in
the narrowest terms, preferring to delay trade wherever possible (a-
gain, reflecting earlier economic warfare objectives). 119
The restriction of non-strategic technology to Communist countries
diverts profits from United States businessmen to their European and
Japanese competitors.120 Even though the absolute volume of United
States industrial exports continues to grow, our share of Eist bloc exports,
when compared to Western Europe and Japan, is very small. The United
States supplies about 4 percent of the total, ranking tenth behind West
Germany, France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, Austria,
Belgium-Luxemburg, Switzerland and Sweden.121 Furthermore, it is
likely that our share of East bloc exports will decline in the future.
122
United States firms that manufacture the following non-strategic com-
modities will suffer in particular: machine tools for metalworking; lifting
and loading machinery; products and equipment for polymerization; iron
and steel tubes and pipes; textile machines; off road tractors; 23 semi-
conductors; integrated circuits; the capability to produce calculators and
statistical machines; medical and pharmaceutical equipment; large com-
puters.' 24 Soviet demand for United States technology, nevertheless, has
been increasing rapidly in the recent past and offers even brighter pros-
pects for future trade. 125 Potential sales losses to United States firms from
the restriction on large computers alone totals $289,000,000 annually, or
117. EAA '69 § 2403-b(2), supra note 2.
118. See APPENDICES, supra note 5, at 452.
119. Id. at 447.
120. Advanced Technology Hearings, supra note 7, at 37.
121. West Germany supplies 40.9 percent; France, 10 percent; and Italy, 8.7 percent. Morton,
THE UNITED STATES ROLE IN EAST WEST TnADE: PROBLEMS AND PitOSPECTs 6 (August, 1975).
122. Id. at 19.
123. Soviet Economic Outlooks Hearings Before the Joint Economic Committee, 93rd Cong., 1st
Sess. 116 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Third Quarter Report].
124. APPENDICES, supra note 5, at 445.
125. Third Quarter Report, supra note 124, at 118.
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40 percent of overall U.S. sales.' 26 Despite such prospective commercial
gains, the United States continues to prohibit the export of non-strategic
advanced technology to Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R.
I. CONGRESSIONAL REFORM: THE EXPORT
ADMINISTRATION AMENDMENTS OF 1977
In June 1977, Congress extended and amended the Export Adminis-
tration Act of 1969, which expired on September 30, 1976.127 The Export
Administration Amendments of 1977, effective through September 30,
1979, attempt to clarify licensing criteria, reduce licensing delay and
eliminate unilateral controls. The amendments also require the submis-
sion of special reports to Congress.'
28
With respect to licensing criteria, Congress attempted to clarify and
limit the meaning of "national security." It should be remembered that
under the 1974 Amendments to the 1969 Act, Congress empowered the
Secretary of Defense to review export applications to "controlled" coun-
tries to determine whether they would "significantly increase the military
capability of such country." 29 In the 1977 Amendments to this provision,
Congress expanded the authority of the Secretary of Defense by provid-
ing that the Secretary review exports to countries other than Communist
countries. At the same time, Congress narrowed such authority by au-
thorizing the Secretary to recommend disapproval only of those exports
which would clearly be detrimental to the national security.' 30 Congress
deleted the "controlled country" terminology and substituted for it
"countries to which exports are restricted for national security pur-
poses."u 31 In addition, Congress changed the criteria the Defense De-
partment is to use in recommending disapproval ofan export. Rather than
curtailing those exports which "significantly increase the military capabil-
ity of a [controlled] country,"' 32 the Department of Defense may prohibit
only those that "make a significant contribution, which would prove
detrimental to the national security of the United States, to the military
potential of such country. "1s Finally, Congress offered the following
amplification of the definition of national security:
126. APPENDICES, supra note 5, at 469.
127. EAA '77, supra note 2.
128. Id.
129. All of the controlled countries are Communist nations, EAA '74, supra note 42. § 9.
130. H.R. 95-190, supra note 106, at 8-10.
131. EAA '77, supra note 1, § 103.
132. EAA '69, supra note 2, § 2403(h).
133. EAA '77, supra note 1, § 103.
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In administering export controls for national security purposes as pre-
scribed in. . .this Act. . .United States policy toward individual
countries shall not be determined exclusively on the basis of a coun-
try's Communist or non-Communist status but shall take into account
such factors as the country's present and potential relationship to the
U.S., its present and potential relationship to countries friendly or
hostile to the U.S., its ability and willingness to control retransfers of
U.S. exports in accordance with U.S. policy, and such other factors as
the President many deem appropriate. 1-
These changes were to become effective December 31, 1978.135
A second revision is directed toward reducing licensing delays, The
1969 Act, as amended in 1974, required the OEA to decide upon licenses
within ninety days, or give the applicant reason for any delay. 13" Congres-
sional intent of the 1977 Amendments is that any license application be
approved within ninety days of its receipt. 1 37 Congress recognized that a
useful incentive for improved performance was needed.138 The 1977
Amendments state that an export application shall be approved within
ninety days orit shallbe deemed to be approved unless statutory reasons for
the delay are given in writing.139
The 1977 Amendments also attempt to eliminate United States
unilateral controls. Originally, two clauses in the Export Administration
Act discussed United States restrictions in view of foreign availability.
The first clause stated that if the national security is threatened, the
President may deny export applications, regardless of foreign availabil-
ity. 140 The controlling clause, however, stated that notwithstanding the
above cited clause, the President shall remove export controls if items of
comparable quality are available without restriction from sources outside
the United States, unless otherwise detrimental to national security. 141
In amending the foreign availability clauses, Congress intended to elimi-
nate United States unilateral controls and adopt a policy that". . goods
freely available elsewhere shall not be controlled for export from the
United States unless it is demonstrated that the absence ofcgntrols would
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. EAA '69, supra note 2, § 2403 (g).
137. S. Rep. No. 95-104, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1977) [hereinafter cited as S. 95-104].
138. Id. at 14.
139. EAA '77, supra note 1, § 107.
140. EAA '69, supra note 2, § 2403 (b).
141. Id.
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damage the national security."'142 The 1977 Amendments omit the first
clause altogether, but retain the second clause substantially un-
changed. '
43
Lastly, the 1977 Amendments call for the submission of four special
reports to Congress. The first report deals with COCOM. Congress,
realizing that it is time to reconsider Uffited States participation in
COCOM, requires the President to submit to Congress a special report
on multilateral export controls by June 22, 1978.144 Acknowledging a
need for changes in the United States Commodity Control List and the
COCOM embargo list in light of the nation's security and commercial
interests,' 45 Congress requires the Secretary of Commerce to review
unilateral and multilateral export controls and report' to Congress by
December 31, 1978.146 The amendments state that the President shall
report to Congress the results of a study evaluating the effect of industrial
technology exports on the international competitive advantage of the
United States.' 47 Congress also recognized the necessity of studying the
transfer of technical data to countries to which exports are restricted for
national security purposes to determine the extent to which such data
exports might prove detrimental to the United States national security or
foreign policy.' 48 Accordingly, the amendments state that the President
shall conduct such a study and report to Congress by June 22, 1978.149
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE CHANGES: EXTENT TO WHICH
SHORTCOMINGS STILL EXIST
The Export Administration Amendments of 1977 fail to reach the
roots of the export control problems. Congressional intent remains con-
fused in that no test is provided for balancing tradeoffs between economic
gains and military detriments arising from exports to Communist coun-
tries.' 50 Moreover, the OEA's licensing procedure is virtually the same.
A cumbersome network of interagency consultations, coupled with the
rule of unanimous approval for the issuance of a validated license will
142. H.R. 95-190, supra note 106, at 8.
143. EAA '77, supra note 1, § 103.
144. Id. § 117.
145. H.R. 95-190, at 21, supra note 106.
146. EAA "77, supra note 1, § 118.
147. Id. § 119.
148. S. 95-104, supra note 138, at 35.
149. EAA '77, supra note 1, § 120.
150. See generally Id. §§ 101-20.
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continue to cause excessive delays in approving advanced technology
exports to the Soviet bloc. The 1977 Amendments put the same encum-
brances on "countries to which exports are restricted for national security
purposes."'151 To the extent that this new list of countries is substantially
similar to the old one, no procedural advantage has been gained. The
criteria determining which countries will be on the new list never rejects
"Communist status" as a standard for automatic inclusion. 15 2 Rather, it
expands the potential length of the list by allowing for the possibility that
other countries may also be included.' 53 Furthermore, even where a
Communist country would be removed from the list, the Defense De-
partment has review and veto authority over all exports to such nations
under the Defense Appropriations Act of 1975.' L" Finally, the newly
enacted requirement that the applicant be informed in writing of rea-
sons for delays in excess of ninety days fails to give the OEA a signifi-
cantly greater incentive to process an application within the prescribed
time period. The Department of Commerce has employed this proce-
dure since 1974, yet delay time for East bloc technology export applica-
tions continues to increase.
National security standards still retain their ambiguity. Congress has
yet to provide guidelines that preclude the Defense Department, under
the guise of national security, from banning exports that contribute only
to Communist economic potential. The requirement that Department of
Defense recommend the disapproval only of those exports which make a
significant contribution to the military potential of a country or that would
prove detrimental to the national security of the United States, adds
nothing new to the export administration criteria. The statement of policy
has contained this standard since 1969.1 55
Even though the Executive Branch shall submit reports to Congress
on the feasibility of continued United States participation in COCOM,
the multilateral embargo system remains unchanged. 156 Consequently,
Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. continue to receive Western technol-
ogy of the greatest military importance.' 57 Furthermore, the United
States persists in unilaterally restricting the export of non-strategic
technology. Despite Congressional intent to eliminate unilateral controls
on such items, Congress overlooks the source of the problem. As long as
151. Id. § 103.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Department of Defense Appropriations Act, supra note 42.
155. See text accompanying notes 105-13.
156. EAA '69, supra note 2, § 2402.
157. EAA '77, supra note 1, § 117.
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the CIA defines foreign availability in the narrowest terms, the OEA can
impose unilateral controls without violating the language of the Export
Administration Act. 15 8 Such restrictions unnecessarily divert sales from
United States businessmen to their European and Japanese com-
petitors. 1
5 9
V. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
In 1969 Congress recognized the benefits of exporting to Eastern
Europe and the U.S.S.R. when it declared that United States policy was
to encourage trade, unless detrimental to the national security. 160 To
effectively insure that the OEA will actually account for the financial
advantages of trade when making its licensing decisions, Congress should
clarify the intent of the law by specifying tradeoffs between economic
gains and military threats.' 6 '
The simplification of licensing procedure would reduce the vast
majority of licensing delays. The OEA's entire process, however, needs
revision. Only the Operating Committee should decide on license appli-
cations. It could utilize a priority system that sorts commodities on the
Commodity Control List into appropriate classifications, the lowest re-
quiring only a quick evaluation and the highest a thorough review. Such a
system, if carefully developed, would convert the processing of many
applications to a computerized operation.' 62 Moreover, for those com-
modities which the Committee members personally review, the re-
quirement of a supermajority should replace the rule of unanimity.
Congress should repeal section 709 of the Defense Appropriation Act of
1975, mandating that the Secretary of Defense review all exports to
Communist countries. Finally, applications not decided upon within 90
days should be deemed to be approved.
Exports should be curtailed only for national security or short supply
reasons. National interest and foreign policy should be eliminated as valid
grounds for application denials.' 63 The list of items on the Commodity
Control List should require an export license, regardless of the country of
destination. ' Such a list should be revised at least once a year.
158. See text accompanying notes 118-20.
159. See text accompanying notes 121-27.
160. Redick, Recent Changes in United States Trade RegulationsAffecting the Peoples Republic of
China: A Market Decontrolled, 13 VA. J. INT. LAW 78 (1972).
161. APPENDiCES, supra note 5, at 443.
162. Advanced Technology Hearings, supra note 7, at 254.
163. Part I Hearings, supra note 87, at 610.
164. Berman, supra note 11, at 867.
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While revision of the OEA would result in tighter and more efficient
export administration, the problems of COCOM, unfortunately, cannot
be solved so easily. COCOM is an obsolete organization. While it effec-
tively served the purposes of economic warfare after World War II,
neither the mechanism nor the goal are appropriate today. Therefore, the
United States should propose the disbanding of COCOM. The remaining
problem, that of United States unilateral controls despite foreign availa-
bility, can be effectively dealt with by replacing the CIA as the group that
determines the extent of such availability. Congress should designate that
these decisions be made by a panel consisting of representatives from
private industry and the Commerce, State and Defense Departments. In
retrospect, such proposals would allow the United States to realize the
foremost goal of export administration: to reap the commercial benefits of
trade without threatening the national security.
See the chart attached at the end of this volume for a graphic illustration of tho
export licensing procedure within the Office of Export Administration. This chart Is
taken from Advanced Technology Hearings, supra note 7, at 78..79.
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